To use a fancy word, there’s a metacognition deficit. Very few in public life habitually step back and think about the weakness in their own thinking and what they should do to compensate. A few people I interview do this regularly (in fact, Larry Summers is one). But it is rare. The rigors of combat discourage it.
Of the problems that afflict the country, this is the underlying one.
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
David Brooks: The Master of False Equivalencies
Monday, August 23, 2010
I am now a fan of Current TV
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
testing my blog twitter feed
here come the terrorist babies from the future!!!
Two things i like about this clip. One when cooper asks her if she has any proof and the crazy lady says "in the initial conversation with your producers i wasn't told i'd be grilled to produce any evidence of what i'm saying is true". Second is that her botox makes her look like the crypt keeper - only her mouth moves and the rest is wrinkled and dead looking. Love it.
P90X update
sometimes you just really want chicken nuggets
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Zandi Blinder paper
I don't have enough of a background in economic forecasting to really dissect the paper's conclusions but I'll point out that Zandi is not a liberal economist, and in fact was a McCain economic adviser. Also, as I understand they used pretty standard models to make their analysis and it is relatively consistent with related alalysis from the CBO.
But the main reason I read the paper wasn't for the stimulus analysis but because i was interested in exactly how the Moody's Analytics economic model works and that's touched on in Appendix B of the paper. It talks about inputs to the model such as credit spreads (TED, LIBOR etc), household cash flow, mortgage rates, treasury yields, Federal Reserve asset values, undewriting standards on lending, business cost of capital (corporate bond yields), labor supply (based on full employment level of labor), and other capital stack input factors, FOMC's inflation target and several other factors. This is covered starting on page 18 of the paper. If anyone knows more about the nitty gritty of how this model functions please add a comment.
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Elizabeth Warren and the CFPA
Likewise, having the formidable, and seemingly strong priored Warren at the head of CPFA is dangerous. She seems to have strong beliefs and the analytical ability to plow through anyone in her way.
http://modeledbehavior.com/2010/07/29/the-confirmation-bias-of-e-warren/
Its very strange to me that many seem to think its critical that the head of the consumer finance protection bureau not be too interesting in protecting consumers. and more so that they think its a convincing argument to anyone who's not out to support the financial industry over the rest of the country. And as many others have said, the politics of it before the midterms make the appointment a no brainer. sure the financial industry is gonna be pissed and they might weaken support for democrats in the future. but they're already pissed and many are already publicly blaming obama for economic weakness in spite of the unprecedented stimulus measures he's pushed through. so i'm operfectly happy to piss them off and try to keep our congressional majorities with a great, publically popular pick for CFPA.
By the way, there's more to Karl Smith's criticism of Warren, which is why I linked it, but it basically boiled down to she's too tough and she will have "confirmation bias", ie she thinks to banks need agressive regulation already and therefore will agresively regulate the banks even if the data doesn't warrant it. Well, lets just say i'm not too worried about the banks or their overregulation right now. After a couple decades of deregulation and growth in the financial industry's wealth and influence, i think they, their lobbyists and their pawns in congress are perfectly capable of looking after their interests.
So my body has continued to deteriorate
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
BASEL III - nerdy finance stuff you don't care about
One of the most important and highly debated issues in the currently BASEL III negotiations is capital requirements. Capital requirements are regulations controlling the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk weighted assets. This basically means banks much be able to absorb the unexpected loss of value to risky assets (think subprime mortgage loans, MBS’s, etc) with cash or highly liquid, non-risky assets they have. To be more specific:
Wikipedia.org - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_capital
The big problem with the current capital requirements as defined by BASEL II is that it just doesn’t include lots of risky assets. These assets are called “off balance sheet”. This was apparently partially adressed in BASEL II but not implemented in the US till 2007, after the bubble was built on the back of overleveraged banks and other financial institutions with short term financing (often as short as overnight on REPO markets). But even after 2007, there remained the possibility to hide risky assets in off-balance sheet entities. Here’s an excerpt from a research paper explaining how a bank could take securitized MBS’s and hide them to circumvent the capital requirements, thus increasing leverage and risk for the institution and increasing the possibility of default and bankruptcy.
to consider an idealized securitization transaction whereby the originator, bound by
capital adequacy rules, sells a pool of assets to an off-balance-sheet entity. What is of
critical importance, however, is the issue exactly what kind of an off-balance sheet
entity takes control over the assets. It may be a special purpose vehicle (SPV), i.e. what
Gorton and Souleles (2005) call a bankruptcy remote, “robot firm,” with no employees,
no physical existence, and no capacity to make substantial economic decisions. SPVs
typically carry out predefined tasks of tranching pools of receivables obtained from the
originator into asset-backed securities which are then sold on the market in much the
same way as described above. Alternatively, the originating bank could set up an offbalance-
sheet conduit called structured investment vehicle (SIV), a physically existing,
managed and leveraged financial company whose purpose will be to undertake arbitrage
by buying long-term fixed-income assets from its sponsors to fund them with short-term
liabilities such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP).
As Shin (2008) astutely observes, the critical difference between SPVs and SIVs
stems from the fact that selling a loan is entirely different from issuing liabilities against
it. While the former – to the extent that loans are indeed passed down the chain –
contributes to spreading credit risk around the whole economic system, the latter keeps
it concentrated around the very bank that originates the loans and only hides it from the
regulators. As recognized by the IMF (2008, p. 69) in one of its latest reports on global
financial stability:
…SIVs and commercial paper conduits, are entities that allow financial institutions
to transfer risk off their balance sheet and permit exposures to remain mostly
undisclosed to regulators and investors; to improve the liquidity of loans through
securitization; to generate fee income; and to achieve relief from regulatory capital
requirements.”http://www.ijesar.org/docs/volume2_issue1/impact_basel.pdf
So banks don’t want these requirements because it limits their ability to leverage and take risk and thus make tons of money. The biggest banks in particular believe they will not be allowed to fail and even if they are, the executives will still be rich and taxpayers or investors will take the hit. And the latest news is that the latest draft of BASEL III is watered down, weak tea.
“Early reports suggest that the final draft accord — agreed to by everyone except Germany so far — largely caved in on its definition of capital, which will allow banks a lot more leeway to skirt the new rules. It also, as expected, allows a long transition period before the new rules take effect. In return, it mandates a minimum leverage ratio. This would be great news except that the new minimum is 3%, or 33:1”-http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/07/are-bankers-winning-again